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Abstract 
 
Many OECD countries such as the USA, the UK or Switzerland are concerned with the 
affordability of utility services and the distributional consequences inherent in the pricing 
strategy of basic goods and services, such as electricity. However, the effectiveness of the 
electricity tariff as a redistribution device is questionable in the presence of a progressive 
income tax schedule. To shed light on this controversy, we structurally estimate a model that 
combines public utility pricing and income taxation. We employ a large panel data set on about 
105,000 households in the Swiss Canton of Bern from 2008 to 2013, including detailed energy 
consumption and household income and tax payment characteristics. While the theoretical 
model predicts that electricity prices should be subsidised in the presence of purely income 
redistribution concerns, we find a positive mark-up of 49%, in our data. This suggests that, in 
practice, the government is concerned with energy conservation as well as income 
redistribution. 
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1 Introduction
Governments worldwide have income redistribution and energy efficiency on their policy
agendas. However, the optimal strategy for achieving these goals is subject to considerable
debate. As such, whether or not public utilities should play a role in income redistribution
remains an open issue. At the same time, the adequacy of different instruments for
achieving energy efficiency, such as CO2 taxes, subsidies for renewable energy, and so
on, are also controversial.
The affordability and distributional effects of basic goods and services such as energy
represents a salient issue in practice. For instance, most energy providers deviate from
marginal cost pricing, relating to the regulator’s role in redistributing income. For exam-
ple, in the case of the CARE program in California, the program directly offers reduced
energy rates for low income households (Borenstein, 2012). Similar concerns about the
affordability of utility services, or the distributional effects of energy taxes are present in
other OECD countries (Deller and Waddams, 2015; Flues and Thomas, 2015). In the
United Kingdom, for instance, expenditures on energy represent the second largest expen-
diture item after food for the poorest 10% of households whereas it is negligible for the
richest households (Advani, Johnson, Leicester and Stoye, 2013). Hence, it is not surpris-
ing that preceding the May 2017 elections, the representatives of both the Tories and the
Labour party supported the introduction of energy price caps if markets “were thought
to be failing ordinary families” (The Guardian, May 9th, 2017). In Switzerland, voters
also expressed similar concerns regarding the distributional consequences of energy tariffs,
especially in light of the 2050 Energy Strategy and its implications, which the population
voted on in 2017 (Meister, 2012; Boos, 2017). The above mentioned issues are even more
pertinent in times of rising inequality, which cause economic, social and even political
challenges.
Residential electricity markets also display particular characteristics given that the
government heavily regulates electricity prices and that (partial) state monopolies provide
the corresponding infrastructure. In practice, most countries finance the cost of energy
transport and distribution infrastructure through energy price mark-ups.4 In fact, energy
providers commonly employ so-called two-part tariffs which include a fixed fee in addition
to the variable charge. From a theoretical perspective, the mark-up is equivalent to a linear
commodity tax and the fixed fee is equivalent to a head tax. We can draw an analogy
4In Europe, almost all energy providers use mark-ups to finance the energy infrastructure. The per-
centage of the grid charge ranges from 25% to 60% of total variable electricity costs (Eurostat, 2017).
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to a consumption tax since we can compare the difference between the marginal cost and
the price to the wedge introduced by a consumption tax between the consumer and the
producer price. This constellation is thus similar to the theoretical debate concerning the
economic justification of two tax instruments rather than one for income redistribution
purposes (Atkinson and Stiglitz, 1976; Saez, 2002).
In this paper, we examine the extent to which the structure of public utility pricing
influences income redistribution in the presence of energy efficiency considerations and
a progressive income tax schedule. Given the ambiguous nature of the results of the
theoretical literature on this topic, more extensive empirical research is necessary. Our
paper aims to fill the gap produced by the very scant empirical evidence on this issue.
We employ an extensive household level panel data set for the Swiss Canton of Bern and
the years 2008-2013. In contrast to previous empirical studies that lack access to such
detailed and granular household level information, and which disregard the existence of
an income tax schedule, we structurally estimate a model that combines both taxation and
public utility pricing. Our model addresses the equity efficiency trade-off in public utility
pricing and incorporates the government’s energy efficiency goals. We account for labour
supply responses to taxation, allow for energy consumption-based welfare weights and for
an asymmetric information setting between the regulator and the utility. Our theoretical
model suggests that if the government exclusively considers income redistribution concerns,
it should subsidise electricity prices. However, instead, our data reveals a positive price
mark-up of 49%. This divergence between the theoretical predictions and the actual
practice of Swiss utilities has different explanations. For instance, labour supply distortions
induced by income taxation shift the optimal mark-up upwards. In addition, a positive
mark-up also emerges if the government seeks to promote energy efficiency.
The paper adopts the following structure. The next Section presents an overview of
the literature, Section three introduces the theoretical model and Section four outlines our
structural estimation approach. Section five describes the data we employ and Section six
presents the estimation results for the structural parameters and the simulation of optimal
prices. In Section seven, we extend the model to allow for asymmetric information between
the regulator and the utility, as well as for two part tariffs. Section eight provides a
conclusion.
3
2 Literature
Our work contributes to the literature on the joint determination of optimal electricity
prices and income taxation. Feldstein (1972a and b) was the first to consider the equity
efficiency trade-off in public utility pricing. His contributions show that as long as the
publicly produced commodity is not inferior, optimal prices will exceed marginal costs.
Such a tariff structure provides gains in distributional equity because high-income individ-
uals implicitly bear a larger fraction of fixed costs.5 The resulting mark-up is a function
of price and the income elasticity of electricity demand, and the mean and variance of the
income distribution in the population, as well as a distributional parameter. He demon-
strates that the optimal price is i.a. higher, the higher the income demand elasticity or
the relative variance of income. Munk (1977) extends Feldstein’s framework to a general
equilibrium model and to a case where the alternative revenue source is an income tax.
He shows that it is more likely that public utility costs are below marginal costs than
assumed in Feldstein’s model. Furthermore, when prices are below marginal costs, and
the commodity must be subsidised accordingly, the redistributional costs are lower when
the government can resort to a progressive income, as opposed to a head tax. In such a
case, optimal prices depend on the distributional characteristics of the income tax. Munk’s
analysis reveals that, as long as the income elasticity of a tax increase is higher than the
income elasticity of the demand for the commodity, the optimal price will be below the
marginal cost. However, the above mentioned papers do not consider labour supply dis-
tortions due to income taxation, which we explicitly analyse in the model developed in
the present paper. 6
More recent papers, like that of Cremer and Gahvari (2002), also ascribe a redistribu-
tive role to nonlinear utility pricing in the presence of an optimal nonlinear income tax.
When individuals differ in both earning ability and tastes, the marginal price a person
5An optimal two part tariff with a fixed fee and marginal prices equal to marginal costs is regressive
due to the fixed component, which resembles a head tax. Feldstein (1972a) implicitly assumes that the
alternative source of revenue is a head tax, since consumers cannot reduce the consumption of the publicly
produced commodity to zero. In this two part tariff approach, consumers are charged a constant marginal
price per unit purchased as well as a fixed fee.
6Jacobs and van der Ploeg (2017) address the more general question of if, from a theoretical point of
view, corrective pollution taxes should also take distributional concerns into account. They show that,
assuming Gorman polar preferences, such as quasi-linear preferences, pollution taxes should not deviate
from the Pigouvian level, despite possible regressive effects. However, under more general utility functions,
they can be set below the Pigouvian level if low income households spend a higher fraction of their income
on polluting goods.
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with a low valuation of public sector output encounters, must exceed the marginal cost.
If however, earning ability and tastes are perfectly correlated, the marginal cost of the
commodity should be strictly below its price - and this should hold for the entire popu-
lation. This latter result is sometimes employed in the public debate as an argument for
subsidising the electricity consumption of low income customers.
We make a number of contributions to this literature. First, we augment these models
to account for energy consumption-based welfare weights. Second, we allow for non-zero
labour supply responses. Third, we introduce asymmetric information between the regu-
lator and the public utility, because in general, the two institutions may represent distinct
entities with diverging interests. Fourth, we structurally estimate our model by drawing
on extensive household level electricity consumption and expenditures information, as well
as data on income and other sociodemographic attributes.
The aforementioned papers illustrate particular cases that are available in the generic
literature that determines optimal commodity taxes jointly with optimal income taxes.
The presence of a second instrument (mainly in the form of indirect taxation) for redis-
tribution purposes, in addition to the nonlinear income tax, has a long tradition of being
contentious in public economics since the seminal contribution of the Atkinson-Stiglitz
(1976) theorem. This influential work demonstrates that, assuming weak separability be-
tween leisure and consumption goods, as well as homogeneous sub-utility of consumption
across individuals, differential commodity taxation is redundant in the presence of opti-
mal non-linear income taxation. This result can also be extended to apply to the pricing
strategies of public utilities. In our context, an analogy can be drawn between the dif-
ference between the price and the cost set by a public utility and the wedge between the
producer and the consumer price, introduced by a consumption tax (Bo¨s, 1984). The
Atkinson-Stiglitz result suggests that, under consumption-leisure separability, differential
taxation cannot relax the incentive compatibility constraint that is inherent in the optimal
tax problem and hence cannot reduce the underlying distortion of the labour leisure choice,
instead, it adds further distortions to the choices between consumption goods (Kaplow,
2006).7 In contrast, Saez (2002) shows that a differential commodity tax can be adequate
7The Atkinson-Stiglitz result applies when, conditional on income, the government sets the same social
weights on similar individuals in terms of income. Saez (2002) shows that the crucial assumption relates
to the conjecture of taste homogeneity - in other words, the fact that the entire population has the same
subutility of consumption. Over the course of time, scholars have challenged the Atkinson-Stiglitz result,
i.a.Stiglitz (1982), Naito (1999; 2007) or Christiansen (1984). Further contributions that ascribe a that
ascribe a redistribution role to commodity taxation relax the underlying assumptions of the Atkinson-
Stiglitz theorem. Hence, with different underlying production technologies (Naito, 2007), heterogeneity
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if consumption patterns are related to leisure choices or earning power. In such circum-
stances, there may be a case for differential commodity taxes if high income individuals
have a relative preference for a specific commodity, or if leisure and consumption of this
commodity are positively correlated.
Our work also contributes to the body of literature that analyses the potential re-
gressive or progressive effects of different environmental policies and energy prices. For
instance, Burtraw, Sweeney, and Walls (2009), Hassett, Mathur, and Metcalf (2009) or
Fullerton, Heutel, and Metcalf (2012) provide evidence for the regressive nature of US cli-
mate policy. Conversely, Chancel and Piketty (2015) find that the bottom 50% of carbon
emitters only cause 13% of global emissions, whereas the top 10% are responsible for 45%
of emissions, making the case for a global progressive carbon tax, which would be borne
by the rich. With respect to energy prices, Borenstein (2012) shows that utilities charge
non-marginal increasing block prices and inefficiently low access fees to protect low-income
customers. Levinson and Silva (2018) find that energy utilities concerned about inequality
charge lower than efficient fixed costs and higher than efficient volumetric charges. How-
ever, in contrast to our paper, these studies do not employ a framework that combines
both personal income taxes and environmental policies. Instead, they solely address the
redistributive effects of environmental policies, without accounting for the existence of an
income tax.
This paper also relates to the literature on the inverse optimal tax-method, pioneered
by Bourgignon and Spadaro (2000, 2012), and used to derive social welfare weights. A
number of studies derive these weights for different countries and different types of in-
dividuals or households (see for instance Blundell, Brewer, Haan and Shephard, 2009;
Bargain and Keane (2010); Lockwood and Weinzierl (2016) or Jacobs, Jongen and Zout-
man (2017) for political welfare weights). We add to this line of research by adjusting
welfare weights to include household energy consumption which reflects the government’s
desire to promote energy conservation.
between agents besides their ability (Cremer, Pestieau, and Rochet, 2001), different evasion characteristics
of income vs. consumption taxes (Boadway and Richter, 2005) or wage uncertainty (Cremer and Gahvari,
1995), there is a scope for redistributive policy via a second instrument.
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3 Theoretical model
Our theoretical model draws on Munk (1977) which is a generalization of Feldstein’s
(1972a) model. We study an economy with N households, a private good produced by
a public utility and a private outside good produced by competitive firms. A benevolent
regulator decides on two instruments. First, she sets the price of the good provided by
the public utility (py). Second, she chooses the income taxation parameter (τ) in order
to steer the revenue generated by income taxation. However, τ controls the total sum
of tax revenue, while a predefined taxation scheme allocates the total sum to individual
households. 8
Household i’s utility is a function of electricity consumption (yi), private good con-
sumption (xi), labour (li) and a taste parameter (θi). Thus, a household’s decision is
characterised by the following constrained maximisation:
max
xi,yi,li
u = u(yi, θi, xi, li)
s.t. pxxi + pyyi ≤ z(li)− t(z(li), τ) + g, (1)
where z(·) is labour income, t(·) is the amount of taxes paid as a function of household
income and the income tax parameter τ , and g is a lump sum transfer from the government.
We assume that u′(·) > 0 and u′′(·) < 0. By plugging the solution of the maximisation
problem into the utility function we can express indirect household utility as:
vi(py, px, τ) = u(yi(py, px, τ), xi(py, px, τ), li(py, px, τ), θi) (2)
The regulator maximises the weighted sum of the agents’ utilities subject to the gov-
ernmental budget constraint:
max
py ,τ
W =
∑
i
wi · vi(py, px, τ) (3)
s.t.
∑
i
[pyyi(py) + t(zi, τ)] ≥ C
(∑
i
yi
)
+ gN, (4)
where wi is the welfare weight assigned to each household and C(
∑
i yi) represents the
public utility’s total costs of providing the good (i.e. electricity generation and energy
8This assumption mimics political constraints or prohibitive costs to redesigning the structure of the
overall tax system. Furthermore, it simplifies the regulator’s decision while still allowing for non-linearity
in income taxation.
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infrastructure cost). We further assume that
∑
i t(zi, τ) ≥ gN such that we do not allow
the public utility’s revenue to cross-subsidise government lump sum transfers.9
Solving the regulator’s maximisation problem yields the first order conditions10 :
∂W
∂py
=
∑
i
wi
∂vi
∂py
− ϕ
[∑
i
yi +
∑
i
py
∂yi
∂py
− ∂C(
∑
i yi)
∂
∑
i yi
∂
∑
i yi
∂py
]
(5)
∂W
∂τ
=
∑
i
wi
∂vi
∂τ
− ϕ
[∑
i
∂ti
∂τ
+
∑
i
∂ti
∂zi
∂zi
∂τ
]
(6)
where ϕ is the Lagrange multiplier of the constraint and we replace t(zi, τ) by ti to simplify
notation.
Combining both FOCs and expressing marginal utility in terms of the marginal utility
of income λi, that is
∂vi
∂py
= −λiyi and ∂vi∂τ = −λi ∂ti∂τ , yields:
−
∑
i
wiλiyi +
∑
i
wiλi
 ∂ti∂τ
∂
∑
i ti
∂τ +
∑
i
∂ti
∂zi
∂zi
∂τ
[(py − ∂C(∑i yi)
∂
∑
i yi
)
∂
∑
i yi
∂py
+
∑
i
yi
]
= 0.
(7)
By rearranging terms we derive the following equation that determines the optimal mark-
up:
py − ∂C(
∑
i yi)
∂
∑
i yi
py
=
(
1− Ry
Rτ
)
1
−β , (8)
As in Munk (1977), we define Ry =
∑
iwiλi
yi∑
i yi
as the distribution parameter of the
good provided by the public utility, Rτ =
∑
wiλi
(
∂ti
∂τ
∂
∑
ti
∂τ
+
∑
i
∂ti
∂zi
∂zi
∂τ
)
as the distribution
parameter of income taxation and β =
∂
∑
i yi
∂py
py∑
i yi
as the price elasticity of commodity y.
In the remainder of the paper, we will refer to the left hand side of the equation (8) as the
(price) mark-up. The sign of the optimal mark-up is determined by the relative size of Ry
and Rτ . Ry is high if households with high welfare weights consume a large share of good
y.11 Rτ is high if individuals with a high welfare weight bear most of an increase in income
taxation. Thus, the mark-up depends on whether households with a high welfare weight
are better off with a price increase or with a corresponding increase in income taxes.
9However, we do allow the social planner to use tax revenues to finance the energy infrastructure.
10We note that we assume the price effect on taxes and the tax effect on consumption to be of second
order: ∂ti
∂py
≈ 0, ∂yi
∂τ
≈ 0
11Hence, Ry is high for basic and low for luxury goods.
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There are two main reasons why the regulator may wish to deviate from marginal
cost pricing in the present model. First, correlation between the welfare weight and
household’s consumption of the good provided by the public utility allows the regulator
to shift the tax burden to low welfare weight households through public utility pricing.
Second, the pricing of y represents a second decision variable for the regulator, in addition
to the income tax parameter τ . The following examples illustrate the intuition behind
this result. The optimal mark-up is zero if all households receive an equal welfare weight
(hence Ry = Rτ = 1) and the effect of taxes on labour income is approximately zero
(
∑
i
∂ti
∂zi
∂zi
∂τ ≈ 0). Since electricity consumption is not correlated with the welfare weight,
the price setting strategy of the utility does not provide any redistributive gains. The
mark-up should also be zero if the redistributive impact of a price change is identical to
the redistributive impact of a corresponding tax change (Ry/Rτ = 1). In this case as well,
the price setting of energy utilities does not offer any additional advantage over income
taxes in terms of redistribution.
While public utility pricing may help to redistribute income, it also distorts households’
consumption. With a non-zero mark-up, marginal utility does not equal the marginal
production cost. This efficiency loss increases with the price elasticity of energy demand,
as shown in equation (8). The higher the absolute value of the price elasticity β, the lower
the absolute value of any mark-up.
We can compare the implications of equation (8) to the Atkinson and Stiglitz (1976)
result of no-commodity taxation. As shown by subsequent proofs (cf. Laroque, 2005;
Kaplow, 2006; Piketty and Saez, 2012), the Atkinson-Stiglitz result assumes that the non-
linear income tax can mimic any commodity tax. In this case, commodity taxes distort
optimal consumption without any redistributive benefit. Two main assumptions drive this
result. First, the regulator can choose any non-linear income tax. Second, preferences are
homogeneous such that consumption is identical across households conditional on income.
In the model presented here, both assumptions are violated. The regulator can only
adjust τ instead of setting optimal non-linear income taxes and the consumption of the
good provided by the public utility might differ among households with the same income
level. In our framework, people differ in two dimensions: their income (earning ability) and
their preference for electricity. Hence, the distributional incidence of any electricity price
cannot be perfectly off-set by the income tax. This would be the case if labour earnings
were the only reason for which people differ. Consequently, under certain circumstances,
public utility pricing that deviates from marginal costs generates redistributive gains.
9
4 Structural model of electricity grid pricing
Households
We assume the following quasi linear utility function and linear energy pricing12 and
separability between the leisure consumption choice. This functional form is appropriate
when the good under consideration, in this case electricity, constitutes a small part of an
agent’s income. Furthermore, such a non-homothetic function implies that consumption
of the good is independent of an agent’s income, which confirms what we find in the data
since electricity consumption does not vary with income conditional on other household
characteristics. yi denotes electricity consumption, xi consumption of the outside private
good, li household labour supply, θi a taste parameter for electricity consumption specific
to customer i and  the elasticity of taxable income 13:
u(yi, li, xi, θi) = xi +
β
1 + β
y
1+β
β
i θ
1
−β
i −

1 + 
l
1+

i (9)
s.t. xi + pyyi ≤ z(li)− t(z(li), τ) + g. (10)
Setting the private good xi as nummeraire, household utility maximization yields the
following demand function:
yi = p
β
yθi (11)
We define z(li) = wili, where wi is wage per unit of labor. The following condition defines
optimal working hours as a function of the taxation parameter τ :
li =
[
wi(1− t′(τ, z(li))
]
(12)
12We do not consider non-linear energy pricing, such as increasing block pricing. While block pricing is
a common practice in the USA, Switzerland and many EU countries use linear pricing. The fixed cost F
of the energy infrastructure indirectly induces a nonlinearity for the average cost but not for the marginal
costs, which is of main interest in the present model.
13In a framework with corrective pollution taxes instead of energy pricing, quasi-linear utility functions
would suggest that the optimal pollution tax should not deviate from the Pigouvian level, according to
Jacobs and van der Ploeg (2017). However, they do not allow for heterogeneous taste as we do in the
present framework. In our model, people differ in their income (earning ability) and their preference
for electricity. Hence, the distributional incidence of any electricity price cannot be perfectly off-set by
the income tax. Furthermore, even assuming homogeneous tastes, the government may resort to indirect
taxation as a practical third-best instrument in order to redistribute income and collect revenues if it is not
able to collect and administer labour income effectively, as is the case in developing countries (see Deaton,
1977).
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Cost of electricity production and transmission
The total costs of the energy utility C(
∑
yi) include two components: The variable cost of
energy production and the fixed cost of the transmission and distribution infrastructure.
We specify the following cost function of the energy utility:
C(
∑
yi) =
∑
yic+ F (13)
where c represents the generation cost of one unit of electricity and F denotes fixed
infrastructure costs.
Tax function
Following Heathcote, Storesletten, and Violante (2016), we define the functional form of
the individual tax burden as follows:
ti = zi − (1− τ)z1−ωi , (14)
Thus, individual tax payments ti are a function of labour income and two additional
parameters. Parameter ω captures the degree of tax progressivity. When ω > 0 the tax
system is progressive, when ω < 0 it is regressive and when ω = 0 it is linear. 14 Parameter
τ determines the average level of taxation in the economy. Specifically, increasing τ raises
additional revenue from households. τ and the total revenue generated by income taxation
are mutually dependent. That is, the total tax revenue required by the government
∑
t¯i
implicitly defines τ for a given sum of total labour income: τ =
∑
t¯i−
∑
zi∑
z1−ωi
+ 1.
Welfare weight
We specify an income-based welfare weight where the welfare weight of household i is
defined as wzi =
(
z1
zi
)e
. e captures inequality aversion and z1 is the income of the poorest
household (Madden and Savage, 2014). In our preferred specification, we set e = 115 such
that:
wzi =
z1
zi
.
141− ω = 1−
∂ti
∂zi
1− ti
zi
= ATR
MTR
(Heathcode, Storesletten and Violante, 2016).
15See also H.M. Treaury (2011), Appraisal and Evaluation in Central Government. Technical report.
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In addition, a regulator concerned with energy efficiency assigns households a welfare
weight based on their respective electricity consumption. This is also in line with more
recent contributions (Saez, 2002 or Saez and Stantcheva, 2016) that posit that welfare
weights may even differ between individuals with the same income if the government
favours some types of individuals over others. Saez and Stantcheva (2016) also advance
the concept of so called generalised social welfare weights, which can be defined very
generally and thus capture a broader set of justice concepts. The characteristics that
are thus part of these welfare weights reflect the dimensions along which society considers
redistribution to be fair. In the present framework, this suggests that society considers low
electricity consumption households to be more deserving and, accordingly, the government
assigns higher welfare weights to these households. Hence, the electricity consumption-
based weight reads:
wyi =
y1
yi
,
The total welfare weight of each household is the weighted sum of the income based
weight and the electricity consumption based weight:
wi = (1− pi)wzi + piwyi = (1− pi)
(
z1
zi
)
+ pi
(
y1
yi
)
,
where pi is the relative weight the regulator assigns to income and efficiency consider-
ations, respectively. 16
Optimal price markup
In this last step, we insert the elements defined above into equation (8) in order to derive
the price mark-up as a function of the parameters that we can estimate from the data17:
py − c
py
=
1−
∑
i
(
(1− pi) z1zi + pi
y1
yi
)
yi∑
i yi∑
i
(
(1− pi) z1zi + pi
y1
yi
)(
z1−ωi∑
i z
1−ω
i −
∑
i[
zi
1−τ−(1−ω)z1−ωi ]
)
 1−β . (15)
16The literature on the optimal direct-indirect tax structure also considers the implications of externali-
ties. Accordingly, Sandmo (1975) or Pirtilla and Tuomala (1997) study the issue of second-best commodity
taxation in the presence of externalities. In this case, differential commodity taxation may be appropriate
and taxing a polluting good plays the role of a Pigouvian corrective tax as well as of a revenue raising
instrument.
17See Appendix B for details on the derivation.
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Based on the optimality condition above, the regulator essentially decides how to
finance the utility’s fixed cost F : either by setting energy prices above marginal costs or
by increasing income taxation. In practice, most regulated energy providers levy a grid
charge on top of the market price of electricity, such that py − c > 0.
5 Data
We base our empirical analysis on Swiss data. While Switzerland is one of the richer OECD
countries, energy consumption is an important part of household expenditure. In fact, in
2013, Swiss households’ spending on energy related to housing amounted to roughly 3%
of their total final good consumption (Bundesamt fu¨r Statistik, 2018), a share that is
in line with that of many other OECD countries.18 Examining the underlying research
question using Swiss data offers several advantages for our analysis. First, the electricity
market for private customers is not yet liberalised. Second, electricity tariffs are subject
to rate-of-return regulation and must be approved by the federal agency, Elcom. Third,
Swiss law demands that energy providers incorporate energy efficiency considerations into
their tariff design.
Our unique household level data includes the Canton of Bern, the second largest Swiss
canton in terms of population, inhabited by 1,001,281 individuals and covering an area
of 5,959 km2. We combine data from three different sources. First, we use detailed
income, wealth and tax data from Bern’s tax administration. This data allows us to infer
various household characteristics. Second, BKW, the Canton of Bern’s main energy utility,
supplied us with energy consumption and expenditure data. Third, we draw on building
characteristics information supplied by the Swiss Federal Statistical Office. Our ultimate
data set spans the years 2008 to 2013. For more information on the data and its merging
process we refer the reader to Feger, Pavanini, and Radulescu (2017).
In Switzerland, customers face a two-part electricity tariff, that is, utilities apply a
volumetric charge (i.e. a price per kWh of electricity consumption) and a fixed fee. The
volumetric charge is a linear price and combines three elements: the price of electricity
generation, a grid charge to finance part of the infrastructure and several taxes on elec-
tricity consumption19. In the context of this paper, the grid charge and taxes represent
a positive mark-up on marginal electricity costs. Table 1 illustrates the relative impor-
18In the same year USA/UK households spent 2.2% / 3.2% of total final good expenditure on energy.
The average for European Union countries in that year was 4.7% (OECD Statistics, 2018)
19A municipal tax and a tax to finance subsidies on renewable energy.
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tance of the tariff elements for BKW. The combined volumetric charge amounts to 23-25
Rp/kWh during the 2008-2013 period. The mark-up on the electricity cost is mainly used
to finance grid investments. The mark-up shows a slight downwards trend induced by a
reduction in grid charges. Lastly, the annual fixed fee is 100-140 CHF, which corresponds
to roughly a tenth of the total electricity bill for an average household in 2013.
Table 1: Prices and mark-up between 2008-2013 - BKW
Variables 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Fixed fee
Basic grid fee (CHF) 142.03 142.03 142.03 122.66 103.68 103.68
Volumetric charge elements
Energy price (Rp/kWh) 11.03 11.03 11.3 11.78 11.83 11.77
Grid price (Rp/kWh) 10.49 11.3 11.3 10.6 8.91 8.91
Swissgrid tax(Rp/kWh) 0 0 0 0 .43 .33
KEV tax (Rp/kWh) .16 .48 .48 .48 .49 .49
Municipal tax (Rp/kWh) 1.59 1.59 1.59 1.59 1.6 1.6
Total volumetric charge (Rp/kWh) 23.3 24.4 24.7 24.5 22.8 22.6
Markup (%) 52.6 54.8 54.2 51.8 49.1 49
Notes: The table presents the prices for BKW’s uniform tariff. We omit BKW’s prices for the double tariff scheme
(separate prices for peak and off-peak consumption) for illustrative purposes. Swiss Grid is the national monopoly
that owns the high voltage grid. KEV is a federal subsidy scheme that finances feed-in remuneration for renewable
energy.
Table 2 provides summary statistics for our sample. We have information on 502,141
pooled observations, including approximately 105,000 households over 5 years. As Table
2 shows, mean taxable income20 amounts to CHF 75,053 with a taxable wealth average of
CHF 578,577. Switzerland is a federal state so taxes are levied on three different levels.
The cantonal tax constitutes the largest part of average tax payments and is approximately
twice and four times as high as the municipal tax and federal tax, respectively. Table 2 also
illustrates that annual mean household electricity consumption reaches 4,926 kWh with a
corresponding electricity bill of 1,066 CHF. Lastly, the table reports different household
and apartment characteristics, which are available in our data.
20Taxable income is defined as total income (in the form of labour income or income from self-
employment) plus the rental value of owner occupied housing less mortgage interest payments and com-
muting and living expenses.
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Table 2: Overview main variables
N Obs Mean Std Dev 5th Perc Median 95th Perc
Tax Data
Taxable income (CHF) 502,141 75,053 128,033 10,615 63,764 161,949
Taxable wealth (CHF) 502,141 578,577 2223694 0 325,365 1717864
Cantonal tax (CHF) 502,141 7,502 15,307 69 5,535 19,175
Municipal tax (CHF) 502,141 3,849 7,192 37 2,907 9,715
Federal tax (CHF) 502,141 1,814 10,205 0 493 6,582
Electricity Data
Consumption (kWh) 502,141 5,649 5,565 1,015 3,939 16,874
Electricity bill (CHF) 502,141 1,226 970 358 941 3,224
Characteristics
Homeownership (%) 502,141 52.9 49.9 0 100 100
One apartment house (%) 502,141 34.4 47.5 0 0 100
Apartment area (sqmt) 502,141 107 44 57 97 190
Married (%) 502,141 56.9 49.5 0 100 100
Household size 502,141 2.1 1.1 1 2 4
Age household head 502,141 54.7 16 29 54 82
Retired (%) 502,141 31.7 46.5 0 0 100
Notes: The descriptive statistic is pooled over all companies and years. The sample contains 104826 unique house-
holds.
Figure 1 depicts income distribution, as well as the distribution of energy consumption,
which are important for our subsequent analysis. The distribution of energy consumption
is heavily skewed to the right, whereas the skewness is less pronounced in the case of
the income distribution. While not presented here, the distribution of wealth looks fairly
similar to income distribution.
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Figure 1: Distribution of electricity consumption and taxable income
Notes: The figure shows the distribution of energy consumption (left panel) and taxable income (right panel) in the
sample. All observations with a taxable income below zero or with consumption less than 500 kWh are excluded
from the sample. In both graphs, the maximum level of taxable income and energy is chosen for illustrative purposes.
Figure 2 correlates electricity consumption to income. It shows that mean electricity
consumption slightly increases at higher income percentiles. In line with the structural
model, household characteristics drive the correlation between consumption and income.
Nevertheless, we should note that there is a significant amount of variation in electricity
consumption present in the sample. For instance, many low income households consume
electricity at levels well above the mean.
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Figure 2: Electricity consumption by income percentile
Notes: The figure shows the distribution of electricity consumption by income percentile. The shaded area depicts
consumption covered by one standard error while the middle line depicts the mean for each decile. The outliers of
this bandwidth are illustrated as dark circles.
Income taxes in Switzerland are progressive, with marginal tax rates that increase
stepwise by income level. Figure 3 illustrates marginal and average tax rates for an
unmarried individual living in the Canton of Bern in the year 2013. The depicted tax
rates are the sum of federal, cantonal, and municipal taxes.
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Figure 3: Individual tax burden
Notes: The graph shows tax rates for an unmarried individual living in the Canton of Bern in 2013. The tax
rates combine federal, cantonal, and municipal taxes. Municipal tax rates are based on the median municipal tax
multiplier.
6 Calibration and results
Equation (15) requires the calibration of the price elasticity of electricity demand β, tax
progressivity parameter ω, and the elasticity of taxable income with respect to the marginal
tax rate .
We draw on earlier work by Feger, Pavanini, and Radulescu (2017) to calibrate the price
elasticity of electricity demand β. In that paper, they employ the same dataset to study
the network financing implications and redistributive impact of distributed generation via
the increased penetration of solar panels. They derive an optimal tariff design for when the
regulator seeks to achieve solar energy targets while guaranteeing the sustainability and
equitable distribution of network costs. Within that framework, the authors estimate the
price elasticity of electricity demand using a geographic boundary regression discontinuity
design. That is, they compare neighbouring households in the Canton of Bern located
in the service area of one of the three main service providers BKW, Energie Thun or
Energie Wasser Bern, in order to exploit these spatial discontinuities and the fact that
Swiss households cannot choose their energy provider since energy markets are not yet
completely liberalised. Based on this specification, we calibrate β to -0.16. Furthermore,
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this estimate allows us to derive the taste parameter θi =
yi
pβy
, as implied by equation (11).
To estimate the tax progressivity parameter ω, we first define zTi = (1− τ)z1−ωi . Log
linearisation of this expression yields:
ln(zTi ) = ln(1− τ) + (1− ω) ln(zi) (16)
Thus, we can obtain estimates for both τ and ω by regressing net-of-tax income on gross
income and a constant. The resulting coefficients amount to ωˆ = 0.046 (s.e. = 0.000)
and τˆ = −0.34 (s.e. = 0.003), respectively. Figure 4 compares the actual tax payments
of the households in our sample and tax payments as approximated by the estimated tax
function. Due to the high density of households, the best fit is obtained for income values
below 100,000 CHF.
Figure 4: Fit of Tax Function
Notes: Actual tax payments correspond to the average tax payments of households in 1000 CHF bins. Estimated tax
payments are calculated for the upper bound of each bin based on the tax function of equation (14) with ωˆ = 0.046
and τˆ = −0.34 .
Given that we do not observe enough variation in tax rates across time, the available
dataset does not allow us to accurately estimate the elasticity of taxable income. This is
why we opt to resort to widely acknowledged estimates from the literature. We set the
elasticity of taxable income  to 0.25, which represents, according to Saez, Slemrod, and
Giertz (2012), a consensus estimate. Additionally, we perform a sensitivity analysis for
inelastic labour supply ( = 0) and a higher value of  = 0.5.
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When using estimated price elasticity β, estimated progressivity ω, household income
zi and electricity consumption yi as inputs for equation (15), the optimal markup
py−c
py
is
a function of the government’s preference for energy conservation, solely represented by
pi.
6.1 Mark-up without redistribution considerations
If the government is not concerned with redistribution, the markup that maximises ag-
gregate welfare assumes an identical welfare weight for all households. Hence, efficiency
considerations prevail. The resulting mark-up is positive, amounts to 48.2% and deviates
from marginal cost pricing. The regulator essentially trades off the electricity consumption
distortion and the distortion that originates from a lower labour supply, due to increased
income taxation. The efficient mark-up is slightly lower than BKW’s current mark-up of
49% and must be accompanied by higher revenues generated through tax payments. In
monetary, terms this means that of the CHF 67.3mn total grid costs, CHF 20.6mn are
not raised through electricity pricing but via increased income taxation.
As a robustness check, we calculate the efficient mark-up for alternative values of .
When  = 0, the efficient mark-up is 0, such that the government completely generates
the required revenue for covering grid costs through income taxation. When  = 0.5, the
regulator sets the mark-up to 53.9 %, so that the public utility recovers the overall grid
costs through variable tariffs, given that the high elasticity of taxable income exacerbates
the distortion of income taxation.
6.2 Optimal mark-up with redistribution considerations
When taking into account redistributional considerations, the optimal mark-up depends
on parameter pi, the relative importance of energy efficiency in the welfare weight. Figure
5 illustrates the simulated mark-ups for a range of different values for pi. When pi = 0,
i.e. a welfare weight that linearly decreases in income, the optimal mark-up is negative,
meaning that the regulator should subsidise electricity consumption using an increase in
income taxation. Our data shows that a negative mark-up is optimal because in such a
case low income households only bear a small share of income taxation, while the differ-
ence in electricity consumption is less nuanced. When pi > 0, the optimal mark-up rises
monotonically. The stronger the emphasis on energy conservation, the larger the mark-
up. This result is also in line with the theoretical literature on second best commodity
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taxation in the presence of externalities. This literature demonstrates that, in the case of
external diseconomies, it is appropriate to apply non-uniform taxation, i.e., a higher tax
on the polluting good that reflects social damages (Sandmo, 1975). The right hand panel
of Figure 5 illustrates the size of the subsidy for ease of interpretation. When pi is close
to 0, the subsidy amounts to approximately 6 Rp./kWh which is substantial, relative to
the marginal costs of 11.7 Rp/kWh.
Figure 5: Optimal mark-up for different welfare weights
Notes: The left panel shows the optimal mark-up according to the optimality condition (15) and a specified pi. The
right hand panel illustrates the absolute difference between price and marginal costs in CHF/kWh. The value of
parameter pi corresponds to the extent to which the regulator emphasises energy conservation goals.
We can also perform the reverse exercise and retrieve the underlying welfare weight
associated with the mark-up observed in our data. In 2013, BKW levied a mark-up of
approximately 49% on the energy price. According to our simulation, this is equivalent
to pi = 0.39 . Thus, in this benchmark scenario, the present policy indicates that the
government not only stresses income redistribution but also energy conservation.
These results depend on the assumed value for the elasticity of taxable income. Figure
5 also depicts the evolution of the mark-up for an inelastic labour supply or for a high
elasticity of taxable income ( = 0.5). Without labour supply responses the curve shifts to
the right so that pi = 0.49 for a mark-up of 49%. In contrast, for very elastic labour supply
responses, the regulator increasingly resorts to public utility pricing above marginal costs
as a redistribution tool. Furthermore, for  = 0.5 , the mark-up of 49% implies pi = 0.27.
The observed positive mark-up is also consistent with an energy efficiency target, that
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is, if the regulator were to limit total energy consumption to a specific level. A lower
(more lax) target has the same qualitative effect as increasing the welfare weight on high
electricity consumption households. However, with an energy efficiency target the optimal
markup is potentially extremely high. Based on the Swiss regulator’s official target for
the year 2020, a demand reduction of 16% compared to the year 2000 21, demands a much
higher electricity price of 0.72 CHF/kWh, and thus a mark-up of 83%.
7 Extensions
7.1 Asymmetric information
Following Baron and Myerson (1982) we relax the complete information setting and con-
sider a case where the regulator and monopoly provider are two separate agents. The
regulator sets an upper price limit for electricity but compensates potential losses through
tax payments. The new budget constraint now includes a transfer S to the monopolist
and reads: ∑
i
[pyyi + t(zi, τ)] ≥ S + gN, (17)
The public utility maximises profits:
max
p
pi = (p− c)
∑
i
yi(p)− F + S (18)
s.t. p ≤ py (19)
where py is the price limit set by the regulator. The following only considers cases where
the upper price limit is binding, that is, p = py.
We assume that the regulator assigns a welfare weight of zero to the profits of the
public utility. 22
Demand y(p) and fixed costs F are known to both agents whereas marginal costs c are
the private information of the public utility. The regulator offers a menu of contracts to
the public utility, each including a price and a corresponding government transfer. The
public utility then chooses a contract by revealing their marginal costs.
21See Energie Strategie 2050 (Bundesamt fu¨r Energie, 2018).
22With full information about the monopolist’s cost, the regulator chooses to transfer S in order to make
the public utility break even S = F − (py−c)∑ yi(py), which is identical to the benchmark scenario where
the regulator and the utility are one and the same entity.
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As a simplification, we assume that the public utility is either a high cost type H
or a low cost type L, with probabilities of µL and µH respectively. The participation
constraint of the high cost type H is binding, that is, the regulator chooses a combination
of the transfer SH and price limit p
H
y , resulting in zero profits. Consequently, SH =
F − (pHy − cH)
∑
i yi(p
H
y ). For the low cost type, L, the incentive compatibility constraint
is binding:
piL(p
L
y , SL) ≥ piL(pHy , SH) (20)
(pLy − cL)
∑
i
yi(p
L
y ) + SL ≥
∑
i
yi(p
H
y )(cH − cL) (21)
The condition indicates that the regulator allows for a positive profit for the low cost type
in order to reveal her true marginal costs cL.
With asymmetric information, welfare maximisation is subject to two additional con-
straints:
max
pH ,pL,τ
W = E
[∑
i
wi · vi
(
τ, pLy , p
H
y
)]
(22)
s.t.
∑
i
t(zi, τ) ≥ E[S] + gN, (23)
s.t. SH ≥ F − (pHy − cL)
∑
yi(p
H
y ) (24)
s.t. (pL − cL)
∑
i
yi(p
L
y ) + SL ≥
∑
i
yi(p
H
y )(cH − cL) (25)
where pHy and p
L
y are the price limits of the high and low type respectively.
Solving the maximisation problem yields the following pricing rule:23
pHy − cH − µLµH (cH − cL)
pHy
=
[
1− Ry
Rτ
]
1
−β (26)
Without a low cost type (µL = 0), the expression is identical to the pricing rule under full
information. However, when µL > 0, the optimal price is higher. Intuitively, increasing
the price for the high cost type relaxes the incentive compatibility constraint of the low
cost type. This effect is stronger, the higher the share of low cost types relative to the high
cost types ( µLµH ), and the higher the cost difference between both types (cH − cL). This
finding dates back to the Baron and Myerson (1982) result where prices under asymmetric
information are higher than in the First Best case for all but the lowest cost type.
Table 3 presents simulations of the optimal price of the high cost type under different
assumptions on the share of high types and the cost difference. We set pi = 0 (no energy
23The derivation is shown in Appendix C.
23
conservation considerations) and  = 0 (no tax induced labour supply distortions) to
simplify the analysis. The last column refers to the case of known marginal costs. Optimal
mark-ups increase under asymmetric information and µH < 1. The increase is more
pronounced with higher cost differences. For instance, with a cost difference of 0.05 CHF
and µH = 0.2, p
H
y should be more than double the price under full information.
Table 3: Optimal pHy (in CHF) with unknown marginal costs
µH = 0.2 µH = 0.4 µH = 0.6 µH = 0.8 µH = 1
cH − cL = 0.01 0.057 0.049 0.046 0.045 0.044
cH − cL = 0.02 0.075 0.057 0.052 0.049 0.047
cH − cL = 0.03 0.092 0.066 0.057 0.053 0.051
cH − cL = 0.04 0.109 0.075 0.063 0.057 0.054
cH − cL = 0.05 0.126 0.083 0.069 0.062 0.057
Notes: The table shows optimal prices for the high cost type with unknown marginal costs. The price of the low
cost type is set to 0.117 in line with the data. All other parameters are chosen as in the baseline case.
Therefore, the presence of asymmetric information provides a different explanation for
the positive mark-up encountered in our data.
7.2 Fixed fee financing
As described in the Introduction, energy providers commonly rely on two-part tariffs.
That is, in addition to the consumption-based charge, consumers pay a fixed (access) fee.
We now add the option of fixed fee financing to the baseline model. The new government
budget constraint reads:
∑
i
pyyi +
∑
i
fi +
∑
i
t(zi, τ) ≥ C
(∑
i
yi
)
+ gN (27)
where fi is the fixed fee and t(zi, τ) is the progressive income tax already introduced.
The regulator generates a share α of total revenues by means of fixed fees fi and (1− α)
through the progressive income tax.
Including the fixed fee as a financing instrument alters the optimality condition as
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follows:24
py − c
py
=
1− ∑i z1zi yi∑i yi∑
i
z1
zi
[
(1−α)
N + α
z1−ωi∑
i z
1−ω
i
]
 1−β (28)
where we assume  = 0 and pi = 0 to simplify the analysis. When α = 0, the government
distributes the additional tax burden uniformly among households, which is equivalent to
a head tax. α = 1 corresponds to the baseline case.
Figure 6: Optimal mark-up for different income tax schemes
Notes: The left hand side shows the optimal mark-up according to the optimality condition (28) with wi =
z1
zi
as a
function of α. The right hand side illustrates the difference between price and marginal costs (py− c) in CHF/kWh.
Figure 6 presents the optimal mark-up for different values of α, assuming pi = 0 (that is
energy conservation is irrelevant). The graph only shows a positive mark-up for low values
of α. In comparison to the progressive income tax system, if the government resorts to a
fixed fee, the burden of taxation shifts to lower income households. Thus, with a low α a
positive mark-up on the energy price is desirable from an income redistribution perspective.
A high α, however, is closer to the baseline case where low income households bear a minor
share of additional tax revenue. The mark-up based on BKW’s pricing strategy amounts
to 49% and suggests that α = 0.17.
24See the Appendix D for the derivation.
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8 Conclusion
With rising concerns regarding the affordability of electricity and the redistributive impact
of the rate structure of electricity pricing, additional research is required in order to
gain a deeper understanding of these topics. Our paper addresses these issues within a
framework that combines public utility pricing and income taxation using an extensive
household-level data set for the Swiss Canton of Bern. Our structural model focuses on
the residential electricity market. The regulator simultaneously decides on the price set by
electricity providers and the tax revenue generated through income taxation, maximising
the weighted sum of household utilities. The resulting sign of the optimal electricity price
mark-up depends on the electricity consumption share of different household types, as well
as the distribution of the income tax burden. The calculations show that if theincome
redistribution concerns predominate, electricity price mark-ups should be negative. In
contrast, the mark-up levied by the Swiss energy utility, BKW, is positive and amounts
to 49% in the year 2013. We find several possible explanations for this discrepancy. First,
an elastic labour supply induces efficiency costs for income taxation, shifting the optimal
mark-up upwards. Second, a larger emphasis on energy conservation goals expressed in
terms of the welfare weight also increases the mark-up.25 Last, asymmetric information
between the regulator and the public utility may lead to an increase in the mark-up for
high marginal cost firms.
25Swiss law requires energy providers to offer tariffs that stimulate energy efficiency.
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Appendix
A Derivation of optimal markup
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i
yi
]
=
∑
i
wiλiyi
(py − ∂C(
∑
i yi)
∂
∑
i yi
)
∂
∑
yi
∂py
=
∑
wiλiyi∑
wiλi
( ∂ti
∂τi
∂
∑
ti
∂τ
) −∑
i
yi
py − ∂C(
∑
i yi)
∂
∑
i yi∑
i yi
∂
∑
i yi
∂py
=
∑
iwiλi
yi∑
i yi∑
wiλi
( ∂ti
∂τi
∂
∑
i ti
∂τ
) − 1
py − ∂C(
∑
i yi)
∂
∑
i yi
py
= −
(
1− Ry
Rτ
)
1
py∑
i yi
∂
∑
i yi
∂py
py − ∂C(
∑
i yi)
∂
∑
i yi
py
=
(
1− Ry
Rτ
)
1
−β , (29)
where β is the price elasticity of electricity demand.
B Derivations related to the structural model
Household Optimization
max
yi,li,xi
L(yi, li, xi, θi) = xi + β
1 + β
y
1+β
β
i θ
1
−β
i −

1 + 
l
1+

i − ϕh
[
xi + pyyi − z(li) + t(z(li), τ)− g
]
First order conditions:
∂L
∂xi
= 1− ϕh = 0
∂L
∂yi
= y
1
β
i θ
1
−β
i − ϕhpy = 0
∂L
∂li
= l
1

i − (1− t′(zi, τ))wiϕh = 0
⇒ yi = pβyθi
⇒ li = [(1− t′(zi, τ))wi]
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Price elasticity of electricity demand:
py∑
yi
∂
∑
yi
∂py
m =
py
pβy
∑
θi
βpβ−1y
∑
θi = β.
Distribution parameter of income taxation
The first derivatives of ti and
∑
i ti with respect to τ act as input for the optimality
condition presented in equation (8):
∂ti
∂τ
= z1−ωi
∂
∑
ti
∂τ
=
∑
i
(
z1−ωi
)
The marginal tax rate ∂ti∂zi can be computed by taking the derivative of the tax function:
t′i =
∂ti
∂zi
= 1− (1− ω)(1− τ)z−ωi (30)
such that
∂(1− t′i)
∂τ
= −(1− ω)z−wi (31)
To structurally estimate our model, we approximate the effect of a change in τ on total
tax revenue as follows: ∑
i
∂ti
∂zi
∂zi
∂τ
≈
∑
i
∂ti
∂zi
∂zi
∂(1− t′i)
∂(1− t′i)
∂τ
,
that is, labor supply reacts to changes in marginal tax at the status quo income level26.
The change in labour income following a change in the marginal net-of-tax rate can be
expressed in term of the tax elasticity of taxable income  = ∂zi
∂(1−t′i)
(1−t′i)
zi
:
∂zi
∂(1− t′i)
= 
zi
(1− t′i)
= 
zi
(1− ω)(1− τ)z−ωi
(32)
Thus,
Rτ = λ
∑
wi
(
z1−ωi∑
z1−ωi − 
∑
i[
zi
1−τ − (1− ω)z1−ωi ]
)
(33)
26Thus, the second order effect of the income change on the marginal tax rate is omitted.
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C Derivation of optimal pricing with asymmetric information
Under asymmetric information, the regulator maximizes expected welfare and faces two
additional constraints:
max
pH ,pL,τ
W = E
[∑
i
wi · vi
(
τ, pLy , p
H
y
)]
(34)
s.t.
∑
i
t(zi, τ) ≥ E[S] + gN, (35)
s.t. SH ≥ F − (pHy − cL)
∑
i
yi(p
H
y ) (36)
s.t. (pL − cL)
∑
i
yi(p
L
y ) + SL ≥ (cH − cL)
∑
i
yi(p
H
y ) (37)
where pHy and p
L
y are price limits of the high and low type respectively.
The corresponding first order conditions are:
pL :
∑
i
wiE
[
∂vi
∂pLy
]
= ϕE
[
∂SL
∂pLy
]
(38)
pH :
∑
i
wiE
[
∂vi
∂pHy
]
= ϕE
[
∂SH
∂pHy
+
∂SL
∂pHy
]
(39)
τ :
∑
i
wi
∂vi
∂ti
∂ti
∂τ
= −ϕ∂
∑
i ti
∂τ
(40)
where we define ∂vi∂ti = λ as in the baseline model. Condition 1 and 3 together imply that
for the low cost type pricing is identical to the case with full information, i.e. there is no
distortion at the top.
For the high cost type note that:
∂SH
∂pHy
= −
[
(pHy − cH)
∂
∑
i yi(p
H
y )
∂pHy
+
∑
i
yi(p
H
y )
]
∂SL
∂pHy
= (cH − cL)
∂
∑
i yi(p
H
y )
∂pHy
Thus
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µH
∑
i
wiλiyi = −
∑
i
∂ti
∂τ
∂
∑
i ti
∂τ
λE
[
∂SL
∂pHy
+
∂SL
∂pHy
]
µH
[
(pHy − cH)
∂
∑
i yi(p
H
y )
∂pHy
+
∑
i
yi(p
H
y )
]
− µL
[
(cH − cL)
∂
∑
i yi(p
H
y )
∂pHy
]
= µH
∑
iwiλiyi∑
iwiλi
∂ti
∂τ
∂
∑
i ti
∂τ[(
pHy − cH −
µL
µH
(cH − cL)
)
∂
∑
i yi(p
H
y )
∂pHy
+
∑
i
yi(p
H
y )
]
=
∑
iwiλiyi∑
iwiλi
∂ti
∂τ
∂
∑
i ti
∂τ
pHy − cH − µLµH (cH − cL)
pHy
=
[
1− Ry
Rτ
]
1
−β
D Derivation of Rτ with fixed fee
Share α determines the relation between total fixed fees and the progressive income tax
revenue:
α
∑
i
fi = (1− α)
∑
i
tpi (41)
Aggregate tax burden: ∑
i
ti =
∑
i
fi +
∑
i
tpi (42)
=
1− α
α
∑
i
tpi +
∑
i
tpi (43)
=
∑
i t
p
i
α
(44)
Individual tax burden if fi is spread equally across households:
ti = fi + t
p
i (45)
=
1
N
(1− α)
α
∑
i
tpi + t
p
i (46)
Derivatives of aggregate and individual tax burden w.r.t. τ :
∂
∑
i ti
∂τ
=
∑
i z
1−ω
i
α
(47)
∂ti
∂τ
=
(1− α)
Nα
∑
i
z1−ωi + z
1−ω
i (48)
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Thus:
Rτ =
∑
i
wiλi
(
∂ti
∂τ
∂
∑
ti
∂τ
)
(49)
=
∑
i
wiλi
(
(1− α)
N
+ α
z1−ωi∑
i z
1−ω
i
)
(50)
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